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Abstract— Metamorphic viruses engage different mutation techniques to escape from string signature based scanning. They try to 
change their code in new offspring so that the variants appear non-similar and have no common sequences of string as signature. 
However, all versions of a metamorphic virus have similar task and performance. This obfuscation process helps to keep them safe 
from the string based signature detection. In this study, we make use of instructions statistical features to compare the similarity of 
two hosted files probably occupied by two mutated forms of a specific metamorphic virus. The introduced solution in this paper is 
relied on static analysis and employs the frequency histogram of machine opcodes in different instances of obfuscated viruses. We use 
Minkowski-form histogram distance measurements in order to check the likeness of portable executables (PE). The purpose of this 
research is to present an idea that for a number of special obfuscation approaches the presented solution can be used to identify 
morphed copies of a file. Thus, it can be applied by antivirus scanner to recognize different versions of a metamorphic virus. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Metamorphic virus problem is still an inconvenience 
subject in computer virology, in recent years. Nearly all 
current anti-virus detectors are relied on syntactic properties 
of viruses. They usually scan sequences of bytes in machine 
code of executable files to match the signature of the virus. It 
makes the anti-virus scanner at risk of the smart virus attacks 
which are employing mutation techniques more and more [1]. 
 In recent years, antivirus products tend to use of semantic 
features to defeat the metamorphic viruses’ obfuscation. The 
most essential problem in regard to semantic approaches is 
need for a lot of preliminary tasks. It requires plenty of time 
for analysing and producing a suitable semantic signature. 
Furthermore, semantic methods are not practical in on-the-
fly scanning [2]. Also, a method that needs a great deal of 
time to analyse and detect a mutated copy of a virus is not 
logical, though it may be enough clever to detect the virus 
precisely. 
Conversely, syntactic signature strategy needs continually 
updated records of signatures. So, to keep a trustful database, 
many experts should spend time to extract string signatures 
and update database with as the most truthful data as 
possible [3]. However, all these endeavours can be simply 
frustrated by metamorphism techniques. 
Metamorphic virus authors make use of various morphing 
techniques to escape from signature-based analysis. Some 
obfuscation skills frequently used by them are 1) garbage 
code insertion, 2) register usage exchange, 3) instruction 
replacement, 4) instruction permutation and 5) Code 
Transposition [2], [4], [5], [6] and [7]. 
In this paper, we use the histogram of instructions 
opcodes as a statistical feature to check the similarity of the 
executables. We try to recognize is a given file a morphed 
copy of another one. We think that while obfuscation 
functions change the visual structure of morphed variants of 
a virus, but many essential common features with these 
variants will be still remained, which contain the basic 
instructions and present their related functions. In other 
words, mutation engines cannot obliterate statistical 
similarity properties of two codes that are similar in 
behaviour and performance.  
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Next section review some related works has been done, 
previously. In section 3, we review some of the most 
common obfuscation rules generally used by metamorphic 
virus engines. Our method is introduced in section 4, and 
experiments and result are presented in section 5. Lastly, we 
give the conclusion and some suggestions for future 
researches. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
In [8], Szor and Ferrie introduced a valuable definition of 
metamorphic viruses and evolution of the code. They also 
introduced some basic metamorphic virus detection methods, 
in general, following with many useful examples. 
Konstantinou, in his technical report [5], gave a 
comprehensive and detailed explanation for metamorphic 
viruses, obfuscation techniques and other advanced skills 
normally used by them. Then, he discusses about 
metamorphic virus detection methods, briefly. 
The method introduced in [1] is based on this concept that 
properties of malwares are positioned in their semantics. 
Preda et al in this paper recommended a semantics-based 
structure for malware detectors. Their approach uses trace 
semantics to distinguish the behaviours of malware while the 
program code is being inspected for infection. 
A helpful explanation of computer virus strategies and 
detection methods is accessible in [9] by authors. They 
explained static and dynamic detection approaches, 
mechanism of metamorphic virus engine and open problems 
in computer anti-virus technologies. 
 In [2], Karnik et al presented a method based on 
frequency of instructions using cosine similarity analysis to 
detect obfuscated viruses. 
Webster and Malcolm in [10] introduced an approach 
towards metamorphic computer virus detection by an 
algebraic specification of the IA-32 assembly programming 
language. Their proposed method based on a specification in 
OBJ of the IA-32 instructions. 
III. OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES 
As mentioned in previous section, metamorphic viruses 
utilize different techniques to defeat string signature based 
detection. In fact, metamorphic virus is able reprogram itself 
to challenge deeper static analysis [9].  
In following, we review some of popular obfuscation 
techniques with examples of morphed codes, to understand 
how obfuscation may change the sequence of bytes in an 
executable to neutralize scanning. 
A. Garbage Code Insertion 
The simplest technique used by metamorphic engine to 
change the byte sequence of viral code is garbage code (or 
dead code) insertion. Inserted instruction has no effect on 
function of the code. There are different kinds of garbage 
code insertion. 
However, more mixed and complicated techniques of 
different types of garbage code insertion can be used in 
metamorphic viruses.  
A more detailed descriptions and examples can be found 
in [6] and [11]. 
 
B. Register/Variable Usage Exchange 
Usage of different registers or memory variables is 
another simple transformation method that metamorphic 
engines use it to mutate their code. This technique attempt to 
evade the string signature based detection as well, by 
changing similar bytes in various generations. In December 
1998, Win95.Regswap utilized it to create different variants 
of the virus. It is clear that it does not influence on the 
function of the code, but the sequence of binaries will alter. 
More detailed information and examples can be found in [8] 
and [11]. 
The combination of this technique with other methods 
such as dead code insertion can make new generations 
enough difficult to detect and make the syntax signature 
based detection entirely unusable. 
C. Instruction Replacement 
This obfuscation method actually substitutes some 
instructions with their equivalent instructions in newer 
copies. Sometimes, programmers can perform an action in 
different ways of coding. For example, to assign 0 to register 
eax, following codes are possible: 
mov eax, 0 
xor eax, eax 
and eax, 0 
sub eax, eax 
 
Therefore, this is a great opportunity for the virus 
programmers to utilize this possibility in metamorphic 
engines. This method is like using different synonyms in 
human language [2]. 
W95.Bistro virus uses this technique to transform its code. 
Szor in [4] gives a detailed investigation and examples for 
this virus. 
D. Instruction Permutation 
In some pieces of code, it is possible to change the 
sequence of instructions with no disturbing the execution. 
Byte strings in different versions of the code will appear 
unlike via this disordering technique.  
If there is no dependency among some instructions, they 
can be reordered. Consider the following instructions: 
op1  Reg1, Reg2 
op2  Reg3, Reg4 
 
If the below conditions are satisfied, these two 
instructions can be substituted [7]: 
1- Reg1 is not equal to Reg2 
2- Reg1 is not equal to Reg4 
3- Reg2 is not equal to Reg3 
 
E. Code Transposition 
This technique modifies the structure of the program in 
form of physically reordering of the program codes, while 
preserving the execution order or flow of the program 
running using conditional jumps or unconditional branches. 
It may be done at the level of instructions or modules. 
An example of such code structure modification utilized 
by Zperm virus is presented by Szor and Ferrie in [8], in 
more detail. 
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IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 
In some mutation techniques, especially for 
register/variable exchange, or instruction permutation or 
even in some lower level of code transposition, the number 
of same instructions is nearly equivalent in various copies of 
morphed viruses. Our proposed solution deals with the 
frequencies of opcodes used in variants as a feature and 
calculates the dissimilarity between two files. We expect that 
if the obfuscation engine employs some particular morphing 
techniques, the frequencies of identical instructions are 
almost equal. 
In addition, to achieve a better comparison, we 
breakdown the files into their building subroutines and 
compare two files according to their function blocks.  
We make an instruction frequency histogram for each 
code block or subroutine. Then we can evaluate dissimilarity 
of two blocks by measure the distance between their 
histograms. It can be done by different histogram distance 
measurements techniques introduced in data mining 
techniques. In fact, each subroutine of a program is 
presented by a histogram of the contained instructions as a 
feature, in form of a vector, which the length of vector is 
equal to the number of total instructions of the machine. If 
we were able to compare the histograms of the building 
blocks of two programs, then we will be able to calculate the 
dissimilarity between two programs using this feature. 
Therefore, if dissimilarity value between two programs is 
less than a specific threshold we can conclude these two 
programs are morphed versions of each other. By this way, 
we can classify different variants of a metamorphic virus, 
which use some special types of obfuscation techniques. It is 
significant to mention that we can use this approach in the 
cases which the applied obfuscation has no effects or small 
changes on the frequencies of instructions 
A. Data Structure and Algorithm 
To measure the dissimilarity between two executable files, 
we follow two general steps. In first step, is a pre-process, 
we prepare our input data in form of histograms as features. 
In the second step, which is a comparison process, we 
evaluate the dissimilarity of a pair of programs by 
comparison of their histograms. 
 In pre-process section, first, we disassemble executable 
files using IDA Pro 4.9 [12] and create assembly code files. 
Then, we analyze each assembly program and extract all 
procedures inside and save them as separate files. In next 
step, we create a set of histograms represent the frequencies 
of instructions within the procedures for each file. As a 
result, for each program, we will have a set of histograms, 
each one for a sub-procedure. Fig. 1 shows the process of 
program disassembly and breakdown into building 
subroutine blocks. 
In the second step, we compare two programs by the use 
of their sets of histograms. Our comparison method is 
similar to that proposed in [2] with some changes to improve 
the algorithm. The comparison algorithm works as follow: 
We have a set of histogram for each program. Each 
histogram driven for a subroutine inside the program and 
includes the frequency of each instruction in the subroutine. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Disassembly, breakdown and feature extraction 
 
Given two programs P1 and P2, containing m and k 
subroutines, respectively. Therefore, P1 has m histograms 
and P2 has k histograms. Each histogram of P1 is compared 
with all histograms of P2. According to our distance metric 
introduced in next section; distance value for each 
comparison will be calculated. More precisely, histogram hi 
from P1 is compared with all histograms hj, 1≤j≤k, from 
P2. That pair of histograms which has the minimum distance 
considered as the most similar histograms and consequently, 
we can consider their corresponding subroutines as mutated 
versions of each other. We save the minimum distance value 
for subroutine i. Once all histograms of P1 compared with 
all histograms of P2, we have a vector of length m, which 
contains the minimum distance values.  We can use the 
average of this vector as the total distance value of P1 and 
P2. It is important to take notice that this distance value is 
not symmetric. It means distance(P1, P2) is not equal to 
distance(P2, P1). Hence, to get a more precise result, we 
define the distance of P1 and P2 as following: 
 
2
122121 ),P)+d(P,Pd(P}=,Pd{P  (1) 
Fig. 2 shows the process of comparison between two 
programs P1 and P2, briefly. 
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Fig. 2  Distance Calculation between two programs P1 and P2 
 
 
B. Dissimilarity Metric 
There are various metric methods for measuring 
histograms distance. The first class of dissimilarity 
measurement is based on Minkowski-form distance metric 
[13]. Consider two vectors of size n, X = (x1,x2,…,xn) and Y 
= (y1,y2,…,yn), then the Minkowski-form distance 
between two vectors X and Y is calculated as: 
 ∑
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Two popular histogram distance measurements are 
Manhattan and Euclidean form distance, Minkowski-form 
metrics with r = 1 and r = 2, as following: 
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As shown in Fig. 3, histogram dissimilarity measures 
based on Minkowski-form compare only the parallel 
elements. It is appropriate for our case that the instructions 
opcodes are independent variables. 
In addition, because we are going to test different kinds of 
programs in our data set, as we explained in 5.2, to obtain a 
common threshold for classification, we normalized the 
histograms before we begin to calculate the distance values 
as following: 
 
∑=
= m
i i
x
XX
1
 (5) 
 
Histogram normalization supports us to find a program 
independent threshold for our data set. 
 
Fig. 3  Minkowski-form distance metrics compare only identical bins 
between two histograms. 
 
V. EXPERIMENTS AND FINDINGS 
We used MathWorks MATLAB R2008a [14] to carry out 
our experiments include of preparing the data structure and 
implementing the comparison algorithm, and distance 
calculation. 
A. Data Set 
In our test data collection, we used different obfuscated 
versions of two famous metamorphic viruses, Win32/Evol 
and Win32/Evul, retrieved from [15] and a number of 
randomly chosen benign programs. Viruses and legal 
programs used in the experiment listed in Table I. 
 An in detail investigation and analysis of Win32.Evol is 
given in [16]. 
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TABLE I 
LIST OF EXPERIMENT FILES 
Virus/Program Description/Application 
Win32.Evol.a/b/c Versions of virus Evol 
Win32.Evul. a/b/c/d/e/f/g/h Versions of virus Evul 
Lib.exe Microsoft Visual Studio 9.0 
Write.exe Windows 7 WordPad 
Wordconv.exe Microsoft office 2007 
Help.exe Windows 7 command line help 
Find.exe Windows 7 command line find 
Drvins32.exe Kaspersky Antivirus 2010 
Perlglob.exe Mathworks MatLab R2008a 
logoUI.exe Windows 7 
 
B. Results and Discussion 
Table II shows the comparison results for each pair of two 
files. The lower triangle (yellow cells) in table, gives the 
distance values according to Manhattan distance or 
Minkowski-form with r=1, and the upper triangle (blue cells) 
is the Euclidean distance values or Minkowski-form with 
r=2. Highlighted cells indicate values less than chosen 
thresholds. Some of false negatives and false positives are 
specified in the table.  
The lower values denote that two programs are more 
similar. If the distance value is lower than a specified 
threshold, then we can deduce those two programs are 
obfuscated copies. So, deciding on the suitable threshold 
value is important. Choosing a low threshold value may 
cause to produce false negative and a very high threshold 
can increase false positives. We believe, generally, threshold 
value must be considered according to the case. For different 
viruses with not the same mutation engines and morphing 
degree, threshold values may be chosen absolutely different. 
In the case of our study, distance values between each 
pairs of three versions of Evol virus are equal to zero. 
Anyway, if we use some other versions of this virus, maybe 
we have to choose a higher threshold to classify the other 
morphed instances of this virus. It can be seen for Evul virus 
variants. If we tend to remove the false positives, we have to 
choose a threshold less than 0.062, for example, in the case 
of Euclidean distance. 
As it is shown in the Table II, in both distance metrics, 
three instances Evul.d , Evul.f and Evul.g have higher 
distance values. After analysing Evul Virus deeply, we find 
that in these three variants, virus inserts frequently nop 
instruction as dead code. For this reason, histograms of these 
versions are disparate and distance values show more 
dissimilarity. 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
MINKOWSKI-FORM DISTANCE VALUES AND CLASSIFICATION 
THRESHOLDS:  0.832 FOR MANHATTAN DISTANCE (r=1) AND 0.186 FOR EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE (r=2) 
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 VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
This study shows that the statistical properties of opcodes 
can be used as a feature to detect variants of obfuscated 
viruses. 
There are two major weaknesses in proposed method. 
Firstly, because a broad range of programs use some of the 
most usual machine instructions and this method is highly 
depend on instruction frequency, is very difficult  to choose 
right threshold to decrease the risk of false positive and false 
negative, as well. Secondly, it works only for a limited range 
of obfuscation techniques. As it is obvious, for example in 
three mentioned cases of Evul virus, some metamorphic 
methods, such as instruction substitution and junk code 
insertion, can simply crush this methodology.  
For the future development of this study, firstly, we 
recommend use of a weighted calculation of Minkowski-
form distance metric. Some instructions, such as mov, push, 
call, and so on, are more employed in all programs. These 
kinds of opcodes can be weighted to create a more precise 
distance metric.  
Another valuable development is to modify methodology 
to overcome the other obfuscation techniques that are not 
considered in above solution. Before we start the comparison 
step, the programs and their subroutines can analysed to 
prune garbage codes inserted or solve the issue of mutation 
via exchangeable instructions to obtain a uniform minimum 
core. No need to say that this pre-process may extremely 
increase the time complexity of the algorithm.  
Also, normalization of the histogram will eliminate the 
length of frequency vector. In this study, we had to 
normalize the histograms to attain a threshold-based 
comparison for classification. However, an advantageous 
study is to resolve the threshold problem, eliminate the 
normalization of histogram, and compare the histograms in 
keeping with the number of opcodes, not according to 
proportion of frequency of opcodes. 
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